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1 Background
This article examines the extent to which donor
policies have been influenced by the political
developments in the region. It relies on the
analysis of policy statements and strategy papers
of key donors, informal interviews with a select
number of bilateral and multilateral donors, as
well as a series of interviews with recipients of
foreign aid. The article seeks to identify what the
donors’ initial response to the uprisings was, the
nature of their engagements with the new
political configurations of power and its
implications for supporting positive social and
political change, in particular on the
democratisation front, which has been a key
priority for all donors.
According OECD’s Recipient Aid Charts for the
years 2007–09,1 the main sources of funding for
Egypt are  first, the USA, followed by Germany,
the EU, France, Japan and then Arab countries.
Tunisian funding sources are different: France is
first, followed by the EU, Japan, Spain, Italy, and
Arab countries contributing less. However, there
are other funders, governmental and non-
governmental, who are funding initiatives with
various goals, which are both formal and
informal in nature. In addition, the
intergovernmental agencies have been active
during past years in providing support and
technical assistance on a wide array of issues
related to development, democracy and
governance, and human rights. According to an
unpublished survey conducted by the Arab Fund
for Human Rights, there are more than 100
(formal) funders working in the Arab region who
provide different kinds of support in different
thematic areas. Egypt is known for its abundance
of international aid emanating from multiple
actors, and several donors report allocation and
absorption problems. In terms of volume, the
biggest donor in the area of democracy,
governance and human rights is the USA via
USAID, followed by UNDP and the European
Commission. Other important actors in this area
include: the Netherlands; Sweden (SIDA,
Swedish International Development Agency); the
UK; Canada (CIDA, Canadian International
Development Agency); Finland; the World Bank;
NED (National Endowment for Democracy);
NDI (National Democratic Institute); IRI
(International Republican Institute); the Ford
Foundation; Freedom House; OSI (Open Society
Institute); Oxfam; IFES (International
Foundation for Electoral Systems); the German
Party Foundations FES (Friedrich Ebert
Foundation), KAS (Konrad Adenauer
Foundation) and FNS (Friedrich Naumann
Foundation); and many others active in related
areas (Kausch 2010).
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While governments have the lion’s share of the
external support, civil society organisations also
have a share. Civil society, in this context,
essentially comprises human rights organisations
with their different branches, and development
organisations, which include new non-
governmental organisations (NGOs), as well as
old ones that have reformulated their missions
and objectives and redesigned their programmes
to take part in the new development realm.
Although the number of NGOs has increased
rapidly during the past two decades, the legal and
political environments are not encouraging but
restrictive: one of the most restrictive in NGO
law is that relating to receiving foreign funding.
In Tunisia, the situation is even more complicated
than in Egypt. In Tunisia, the Ministry of Interior
had been highly active in monitoring funding to
civil society groups. Although the law does not
explicitly require prior approval for foreign
funding, some groups report that foreign funding
has been monitored through the central
government bank, and the government has frozen
or confiscated NGO funds for no clear reason. As
a result, organisations have limited ability to
obtain funds with which to sustain themselves.2
The aggression against human rights activists is
evident.
Although the international aid to the
governments in the region started in the 1970s,
the beginning of 1990 saw the onset of foreign
aid to the new emergent civil society groups. In
Egypt, the Egyptian Organization for Human
Rights received its first foreign funding in 1992.
It was a point of departure, as many other
human rights organisations emerged after that,
relying considerably on foreign support for their
survival. There is no doubt that the foreign fund
had played a critical role in developing and
constructing civil society groups that work on
human rights-related and development activities
during this foundational moment.
During the 1990s, there were two factors that
had a significant impact on the establishment
and directions of the active non-governmental
groups. First, UN world conferences and
summits led to increased recognition of the role
of civil society organisations, in particular in
relation to specific themes such as women’s
rights, child rights and human development.3
The second factor was the violent confrontation
between armed Islamic groups and the state,
especially in Egypt and Algeria, which
significantly shaped aspects of relations with the
international donors as well as the agenda of
human rights groups. However, paradoxically, in
supporting human rights groups, many funders
paid special attention to violations of civil and
political rights such as emergency laws, torture,
right to life, etc., while turning a blind eye to
many governmental abuses in the field of human
rights or the failure to achieve progress in the
field of development.
At that time, democracy and political reform
were not a top priority. In addition, politics,
development and human rights were seen as
separate domains. On the one hand, there was a
controversial debate about the link between
politics and civil society in general and human
rights’ NGOs in particular. That is, civil society
organisations were seen by some as apolitical
entities, while others, especially political activists,
condemned this approach and described it as a
sort of ‘political nihilism’. On the other hand,
there was a gap (institutional and conceptual)
between human rights and development, which
manifested in the lack of cooperation between
human rights and development NGOs. Social and
economic rights were also neglected by
mainstream human rights groups.
Nevertheless, by the end of the 1990s, democracy
and political reform gradually became an issue at
both international and local levels. Likewise, a
steady process to bridge the gap between human
rights and development was initiated mainly by
development organisations. The impact of the
international community was noticeable both
through its shaping of the agenda or through its
funds. A number of initiatives emerged from
2000 onwards as part of a wider policy to
promote democracy. For example, the European
Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights
(EIDHR) (2000–06), which was replaced by the
European Instrument for Democracy and
Human Rights (EIDHR) in 2006; and the
Broader Middle East and North Africa (BMENA)
Initiative of 2004, which replaced the Middle
East Partnership Initiatives (MEPI) of 2002.
It is important to mention that such democracy-
promoting and development initiatives coincided
with other political events, most notably
September 11th 2001 and the invasion of Iraq in
2003. In this context, democratic reform
Mustapha Donors’ Responses to Arab Uprisings: Old Medicine in New Bottles? 100
processes were tied to security concerns. Such
volatile political context had a dramatic impact
on international cooperation in terms of
priorities and effectiveness of foreign aid. Given
that security and ‘stability’ in the region were
prioritised, national governments were given the
pretext to adopt restrictive legislations and to
bargain for democratic reform. In addition, since
September 11th, democratic initiatives in the
Muslim-majority countries had been strongly
affected by the war against terror. Accordingly,
democracy was not seen only as a political issue,
but cultural as well. Although it has to be
achieved through political and legal reform, it
should also, in Islamic countries, be a result of
cultural and religious reform.
Generally speaking, despite the resistance of the
local authorities and the hostile legal and
political environment against civil society groups,
the foreign fund for democracy became
channelled to new areas of democracy promotion
such as monitoring elections, political
participation, media freedom and the right to
association and governance. Foreign funding also
supported the emergence of a new generation of
NGOs, particularly in Egypt, that were more
politically oriented after 2000 and involved the
participation of younger generations who had
benefited from a different kind of technical
assistance and capacity-building activities that
included training, visits and study tours.
2 Post-uprisings debate about international aid
Much of the writing on Western aid in the light of
the Arab uprisings has tended to focus on US and
EU assistance, which are both critically reviewed.
For instance, there is a belief that foreign aid had
no significant input on the uprisings:
Neither the EU nor the EU member states
can claim that the current transition process
in Tunisia or Egypt is a direct result of the
European democratization policy, although for
more than fifteen years, through various
policy instruments and approaches (such as
the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership and
European Neighbourhood Policy) the EU has
made a lot of efforts and has invested not only
in economic cooperation, but also in
democratization projects. (Schafer 2011)
The US administration was subjected to pressure
from the Egyptian government not to support
the activities of civil society; however, civil society
organisations were also reluctant to approach US
funding. Hence, it was clear that those two main
contributors as well as other intergovernmental
and non-governmental donors should revisit the
policies which failed to achieve tangible progress.
One of the main critiques was that under the
guise of ‘Stability’ and ‘Security’, the EU had
supported autocratic regimes. The relation with
Zine El Abidine Ben Ali was a flagrant example.
European Union institutions, member states
and influential southern European
governments supported the Tunisian regime
up until the very day, on 14 January 2011,
when Zine El Abidine Ben Ali was forced to
flee the country. On the website of the Italian
Foreign Ministry, for one, Tunisia is still
praised for its ‘political and social stability’.
The assessment of the performance of the
Tunisian regime was so positive that,
according to EU Commissioner Štefan Füle
who is in charge of the Union’s flagship
European Neighbourhood Policy, ENP (including
Tunisia as its partner country): ‘Tunisia is an
important and reliable partner for the EU,
with which it has forged strong relations based
on shared values and mutual respect and
understanding.’ Accordingly, in May 2010 the
EU was prepared to grant Tunisia ‘advanced
status’, which would have ensured a more
intense political dialogue and included the
prospect of a deep free trade agreement.
(Holm et al. 2011)
Generally, the failure of Western aid to
contribute to initiatives that genuinely promote
social and political change is evident at several
levels. First, failure to boost democracy and
improve human rights; second, failure to
encourage good governance and greater
transparency; third, excessive focus on
governments and elites; fourth, waste and
mismanagement; fifth, mixed record on boosting
trade (Scarpetta and Swidlicki 2011). These
manifestations show that international aid is
politically driven from two sides – donors and
recipients. That failure is not only a result of
mismanagement of the international aid, but also
due to the political context of international
cooperation. Taking into consideration the lack of
political will to carry out political and economic
reform, the incentives are also weak. This helps
to explain the European aid to Eastern Europe
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and Middle East. ‘The biggest reason why the EU
managed to influence the political trajectories of
Romania, Serbia, Slovakia and Turkey, but failed
with the North African states, is that the former
were motivated by the goal of accession, the EU
has not yet found a successful means of
influencing neighbours that have little chance of
joining the EU’ (Grant 2011).
The other example of criticism is about the US
support to Egypt. Although Egypt is the second
largest recipient of US foreign assistance, a small
part of this assistance is directed to civil society to
promote democracy and governance, and this has
been an area of tension between the two
countries. Mubarak’s regime resisted the US
contribution to independent civil society groups
and this affected the amount of funding directed
to them. Accordingly, some experts note that only
a small proportion of the USAID’s democracy
and governance (D&G) funds are spent on
independent Egyptian groups and an even
smaller proportion on groups that do not receive
approval from the Egyptian government. The vast
majority of USAID D&G assistance goes to
Government-of-Egypt-approved consensual,
government-to-government projects (Sharp
2011).4 However, while the major US funding goes
through USAID, there are other alternative
channels. The Middle East Partnership Initiative
(MEPI), which was established by the Bush
administration in 2002, represents another
funding avenue. As compared with USAID’s
programming, MEPI projects are smaller scale
and shorter term, with more modest budgets. In
this sense, MEPI is more flexible in dealing with
civil society groups and addressing sensitive
issues, for example MEPI stepped in to provide
funding for civil society organisations not
registered with the Egyptian government under
its NGO law following USAID’s decision in 2009
to no longer provide direct support to such groups.
While MEPI was active in Egypt under Mubarak’s
regime, it engaged in almost no democracy and
governance programming in Tunisia prior to the
fall of Ben Ali, although it has one of its two
regional offices in Tunis (McInerney 2011).
According to McInerney, the overall impact of
USAID/Egypt’s programmes in democracy and
governance was unnoticeable in indexes
describing the country’s democratic environment
(McInerney 2011: 80–90). The report explained
this shortcoming as follows:
A major contributing factor to the limited
achievements for some of these programs
resulted from a lack of support from the
Government of Egypt. According to a mission
official, the Government of Egypt has resisted
USAID/Egypt’s democracy and governance
program and has suspended the activities of
many U.S. NGOs because Egyptian officials
thought these organizations were too
aggressive. Notwithstanding the Egyptian
government’s negative actions, U.S. decision-
makers did not terminate the democracy and
government program.5
It is true that the lack of support of the Egyptian
government is an important factor. Yet, it is not
sufficient to explain the shortcomings of
international support. There are other factors
relating to the US policies in the region in
addition to other deficits relating to the civil
society domain, which includes inefficient and
undemocratic groups. But generally,
international agencies use ‘the lack of support of
local partners’ to justify the shortfalls.
The disrespect of the foreign fund in general and
the US fund in particular, is dominant among many
pro-government political actors and those who have
a nationalistic ideological mindset. The new
political movements, such as the Kifaya (Enough)
movement did not receive funding and they declare
openly that they are against foreign funding.6
Moreover, there are civil society groups who are
very reluctant to receive US governmental support.
However, many new NGOs, especially those that
emerged after 2000, are the main recipients of that
fund, either through USAID, MEPI (Middle East
Partnership Initiative), Freedom House or NDI
(National Democratic Institute). The anti-US
groups regard such funding as a risk that may lead
to the de-legitimisation of local actors.
This was the context of supporting democracy and
political reform before the revolution. Certainly
there were significant differences between
countries in the region depending on the political
and legal environment, the nature and history of
civil society and political actors, as well as the
degree of political and cultural resistance to
foreign aid. To address donors’ responses to the
Arab uprisings, this context should be taken into
consideration. In terms of donors’ engagement
since the revolution it needs to be asked whether
there any significant change in funding strategies?
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3 Responses of donors’ community
It is apparent that both governmental and non-
governmental donors were surprised by the
uprisings, as were all those concerned with
political reform in the Arab region and they have
tried to respond to such developments in different
ways. For instance, official and informal visits to
the region were common; meetings with
concerned parties, including youth and
representatives of civil groups were organised,
rapid assessments of the situation were conducted
and contingency funds were offered. In addition,
certain organisations and agencies revisited their
strategies trying to match the new needs. Also,
the tendency of some international organisations
to operate directly in the region has been noticed.
Politically, it seems that there were efforts not
only to understand the new developments, but to
build bridges with the new political actors who
may shape the future political configurations in
the country, namely the Islamist political actors
and youth coalitions. But for non-governmental
donors, it seems that the question was: how can
they approach the new ‘unidentified’ activists?
Although all are claiming or seeking new
approaches, there are doubts regarding the ability
of the international donors to engage effectively in
post-revolution contexts. There are question
marks regarding their willingness to change their
own funding approach; whether their approach is
able to capture what is happening on the ground
and whether donor collaboration is prioritised.
3.1 Governmental donors
Neither the USA nor the EU reacted promptly to
the Arab uprisings. As mentioned by some
commentators:
… when protests began in Tahrir Square in
January, the EU was slow and hesitant to
react. Its first official response, drafted by
High Representative Catherine Ashton,
seemed outdated the moment it was released
to the world’s media. Europe’s position was
defined by a subsequent joint statement
issued by British Prime Minster David
Cameron, German Chancellor Angela Merkel
and French President Nicolas Sarkozy, who
made it clear that Mubarak could not count
on European Support. (Dworkin et al. 2011)
In February 2011, after Catherine Ashton visited
Tunisia and Egypt, she highlighted the
challenges facing the transition period rather
than the EU’s strategy of engagement. In an
official statement, she said:
During my visits I had meetings with the
transitional governments, as well as
opposition groups, civil society and the young.
These meetings have confirmed that we face a
threefold challenge and need to put together
a threefold response:
? We need to help build what I call deep
democracy (political reform, elections,
institution building, fight against
corruption, independent judiciary and
support to civil society). Where relevant,
we can draw on our own history of building
democracy and reconciliation including
from those among us who have gone
through these transitions recently.
? We also need to work on economic
development. We are dealing with
extremely young populations, with high
unemployment; a lack of opportunities and
significant social imbalances…
? Third we have to consider what we can do
to facilitate people to people contacts,
exchanges and mobility while avoiding
uncontrolled migration flows. 
(Ashton 2011)
Such political language is ambiguous. For
example, Ashton used the term ‘deep democracy’
to describe the same elements of the traditional
approach to promote democracy and human rights
that focused on procedural dimensions of
democracy. However, there is no clarification about
the difference between democracy and ‘deep
democracy’. In another instance, Ashton used the
term ‘sustainable stability’ without clarification
about the difference between this sustainable one
and the traditional concept of stability. It seems
there is no shift in prioritising security and
stability (or in other words combating ‘terrorism’
and ‘illegal’ migration) and the Arab–Israeli
conflict over endorsing indigenous social and
political forces. Therefore, Ashton is trying to use
new terminology to describe the same position.
In general, two main slogans frame the EU post-
Arab uprisings policy: these are the ‘3 Ms:
Money, Market and Mobility’ and ‘More for
More’. Regarding the first, Catherine Ashton
stated that the EU plans to support its Southern
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neighbours through money: meaning resources
for transitions to democracy and economic
support, for example to help substitute for the
loss of tourism in Egypt and Tunisia. Market
access refers to trade opportunities with the EU
and mobility means the ability of business men
and business women to move around, in order to
conduct business more effectively.7
On the other hand, ‘More for More’ reflects the
longstanding debate about conditionality of aid.
This approach represents ‘one of the pillars of the
new Neighbourhood Policy, and is based on
positive conditionality: if partner countries
introduce more reforms then they will receive
more benefits (more funds and more integration).
This includes demands to set benchmarks to
measure progress’.8 This approach was drafted
clearly in the Joint Communication of the
European Commission which, following the
uprisings, presented a new approach entitled:
‘A Partnership for Democracy and Shared
Prosperity with the Southern Mediterranean’.
According to the official document, this new
approach ‘represents a fundamental step in the
EU’s relationship with those partners that commit
themselves to specific, measurable reforms. It is
an incentive-based approach based on more
differentiation (“more for more”)’. Some
benchmarks were set. In this context:
… free and fair elections should be the entry
qualification for the Partnership. It also means
closer cooperation in the context of the
Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP)
and more joint work in international fora on
issues of common interest. The EU will
continue to offer its commitment and support
to the peaceful resolution of disputes within and
between States in the region. The Partnership
should be underpinned by enhanced political
dialogue. The EU will step up bilateral political
dialogue at all levels, as soon as local conditions
allow, with a strong focus on human rights and
political accountability.9
‘More for More’ is a policy intended to redress
previous failures in promoting democracy in the
South Mediterranean. Nevertheless, it is not
clear how the EU, through its aid, can make its
partners in the South accountable. Likewise, it is
not clear if the EU countries themselves are
willing to hold these governments accountable or
if there is room to compromise in favour of
‘stability’ and ‘security’. And if so, EU and
European governments will be accountable to
whom? In this regard, it is useful to recall what
was mentioned by EU Enlargement and
Neighbourhood Policy Commissioner, Štefan
Füle, to the European Parliament’s Committee
on Foreign Affairs in February 2011. He said,
‘Many of us fell prey to the assumption that
authoritarian regimes were a guarantee of
stability in the region. This was not even
Realpolitik. It was, at best, short-termism – and
the kind of short-termism that makes the long
term ever more difficult to build’.10
As for US support, there were some immediate
reactions from the US side. After revolutions it
was expected that USAID will clearly play a
leading role in supporting Egypt’s transition
immediately following Secretary Clinton’s
announcement that $150 million in unspent
funds were being reprogrammed to support
Egypt’s transition, USAID released a pair of
Annual Program Statements (APS) for new
grants to be given. The first statement is for an
expected 50 grants with a total value of up to
$65 million for democracy and governance
programming, with five main areas of focus:
Civic Engagement/Civic Awareness; Elections
and Political Processes; Access to Justice/Human
Rights; Transparency and Accountability; and
Civic Participation. The second APS is for an
expected 60 grants worth a total of
approximately $100 million to provide economic
support to Egypt (along with the $150 million
reprogrammed) the funding for democracy and
governance also includes $15 million in unspent
funds that were originally designated for that
purpose (McInerney 2011: 80–90).
While the USA has earmarked substantial
funding, the strategic direction of engaging with
the new political context remains unclear.
Donors including the USA assumed that the new
legal and political environment in Egypt would
facilitate the implementation of bilateral
agreements which were constrained under the
previous regime, but there are indicators that
there is no significant change. The Egyptian
Minister of International Cooperation, Fayza
Aboul Naga, attacked the international support
to civil society: ‘I am not sure at this stage [if] we
still need somebody to tell us what is or is not
good for us – or worse, to force it on us’, she told
the Wall Street Journal (Trofimov 2011).
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Therefore, the US support to civil society groups,
especially the unregistered groups, resumes the
pre-uprisings controversy about foreign funding.
Recently, the ruling Supreme Council of the
Armed Forces (SCAF) has steadily escalated a
campaign against civil society groups. On 12 July
2011, Fayza Aboul Naga announced that the
government would establish a commission of
inquiry to investigate the funding of civil society
organisations. Only two weeks later, state-owned
October Magazine ran a cover story – illustrated
with a crude depiction of US Ambassador to
Egypt Anne Patterson burning Tahrir Square
with flaming US dollars – that accused the USA
of undermining Egypt’s revolution by funding
civil society organisations.11
Such a situation has had a negative impact on
receiving funding by civil society groups, not only
from the USA, but also from other sources in
Egypt. Although the Tunisian authorities were
more aggressive in dealing with foreign funding
to civil society after the uprisings, the situation
in Tunisia is better than Egypt. Finally, the
political instability has affected all the bilateral
agreements. Many agreements are held up as
the governments are transitional.
3.2 UN agencies
It is difficult to see concrete immediate responses
by the UN agencies. This is understandable as
UN agencies mainly approach governments and
after the uprisings, there was political flux. In
addition, UN agencies are bureaucratic in terms
of decision-making, which disallows them to
make quick responses. In this context, it was
noticed that their responses were limited to
actions such as official statements, visits to the
region, conferences with stakeholders or
revisiting their strategies in the region.
For example, UNDP developed a strategy to
identify the key areas of support that UNDP can
provide. Generally, the strategy addresses a wide
variety of areas, including political and economic
reform, justice and security reform, gender
equality, youth inclusion, media reform, fighting
against corruption, and governance.12
On 5 June 2011, UN Women’s Executive Director,
Michelle Bachelet, visited Egypt and delivered a
speech at a seminar entitled, ‘International
Forum on Pathways of Democratic Transitions’,
organised by UNDP in Cairo. After Cairo,
Bachelet visited Tunisia. In both countries, she
highlighted the critical role women have played in
the movement for democracy, and the need to
make gender equality and women’s empowerment
a cornerstone of the ongoing reform process.
Another example is the International Labour
Organisation (ILO) response, which was limited
to visits, meetings and official statements. ILO
officials expressed their willingness to support
and actively engage in the transition process.
They highlighted issues under their mandate,
mainly decent work, unemployment and
underemployment, social security, labour market
governance, the right to work, freedom of
association and the right to organise. According
to Nada Al Nashif, the ILO Regional Director for
Arab States:
… the official statements by Director General
Juan Somavia had charted a consistent and
principled course of the ILO as it called on
authorities to respect workers’ rights and to
use social dialogue as means to achieve social
justice and democracy. A special meeting of
Arab Tripartite leaders-workers of Tunisia,
Employers of Algeria and the new Minister of
Labour of Egypt, at the ILO Governing Body
in March 2011 had further confirmed the
ILO’s commitment to this momentous
transformation. The Arab Youth Panel during
the International Labour Conference had
cemented the direction of our response.13
The United Nations High Commissioner for
Human Rights, Navi Pillay, was very clear about
the difficulty to respond effectively to the new
situation in the Middle East. In a press
conference in Geneva on 30 June 2011, she
stated that her organisation, never over-
resourced, was stretched to breaking point.
Therefore it was not easy to carry out the extra
work. To do so, she often had to move staff from
the jobs they were supposed to be doing. During
these extraordinary times in North Africa and
the Middle East, she said, ‘I have not been able
to reinforce the offices dealing with this region’.14
3.3 Non-governmental donors
Non-governmental donors have more flexibility
in responding to the new developments in the
region, as their mission is to support civil society
groups and facilitate communication and
interaction, at least with the ‘well-known’ civil
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society groups. Thematically, democratic
transition and civic engagement is the
framework for many activities, which include
activities relating to civil and political rights, as
well as economic and social rights. Supporting
youth activism is also high in their priorities. 
Other issues have emerged by international
organisations, such as transitional justice and
humanitarian assistance. Yet, there is no
consistent process to identify needs and priorities.
Many donors have to rely on what is called ‘rapid
assessment’, which has been the main tool of many
donors and re-granting entities to identify the
post-revolutions’ needs. Generally, there is a
tendency to address new emergent needs, but also
to continue the regular human rights work with a
new vision that suits the new development. No
doubt rapid assessment is a good tool for quick
responses, but it is unsuitable for strategic
interventions. In addition, such a tool should not
stop further in-depth assessment to understand
the complicated situation in each country. Without
revealing the underlying power dynamics, it is easy
for donors to respond by falling back on the same
old actors or to consider them as the main gateway
to reaching out to others.
However, while it was easy for many funders to
approach the well-known civil society groups, it
was and still is complicated to approach the high
number of the newly emergent groups, as well as
to extend their support to actors outside capitals
or big cities. This difficulty, to some extent, is
justifiable because, for instance, a lot of new
unregistered groups are emerging with different
political and ideological backgrounds in a highly
dynamic and changeable environment. In addition,
many of these groups are active virtually without
any articulate institutional set-up. Currently, the
governmental attack against foreign funding in
Egypt makes many donors cautious and they
prefer to keep a low profile and not to take a more
ambitious approach to engage with new actors.
In this context, it is convenient to highlight some
responses. For instance, George Soros, Chairman
of the Open Society Foundations (OSF),
responded quickly. In an article published soon
after the Egyptian uprising he said:
I am, as a general rule, wary of revolutions. But
in the case of Egypt, I see a good chance of
success. As a committed advocate of democracy
and open society, I cannot help but share in the
enthusiasm that is sweeping across the Middle
East. I hope President Obama will
expeditiously support the people of Egypt. My
foundations are prepared to contribute what
they can. In practice, that means establishing
resource centers for supporting the rule of law,
constitutional reform, fighting corruption and
strengthening democratic institutions in those
countries that request help in establishing
them, while staying out of those countries
where such efforts are not welcome. (Soros 2011)
Practically, OSF allocated an additional or
contingency fund to support local actors in both
Tunisia and Egypt through what is called the
Arab Transition Fund.15
Operationally, the re-granting organisations may
have flexibility to communicate with the local
communities which facilitate delivering small
grants to a wider scope of local actors. Politically,
this approach could minimise the internal
political and cultural resistance to the foreign
fund. But, on the other hand, it might be risky as
some intermediary NGOs may lose their balance
because of pumping a lot of money that may
outweigh their institutional capacity. In addition,
it might lead to mismanagement of grants due to
lack of technical experience, conflict of interests
or the application of exclusionary policies in
relation to the selection process of partners.
The Sigrid Rausing Trust, a grant-giving
foundation based in London, has responded
through what is called ‘the MENA Strategic
Fund’. Like the OSF’s Arab Transition Fund, it is a
special Trust initiative which was set up in 2011 to
support grassroots human rights organisations in
their response to the unprecedented opportunities
and challenges created by revolution, conflict and
crisis across the Middle East and North Africa. In
particular, the Fund recognises the importance of
supporting civil society in Egypt and Tunisia
during their process of democratic transition and
political reform, and the need to support groups
documenting human rights violations in Libya,
Bahrain, Yemen and Syria. The Trust aims –
through a combination of direct granting, project
funding and sub-granting – to fund established
and emerging organisations and human rights
defenders that document human rights violations;
also to advocate for freedom of assembly,
association and expression; support victims of
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arbitrary arrest, detention and torture by state
security forces; seek justice and redress for those
killed and advocate for the rights of women,
religious minorities, sexual minorities and refugees.
Another trend that could be seen after the
revolutions is that many international
organisations concerned with democracy and
human rights began to operate directly in the
region. Although organisations such as the
International Foundation for Electoral Systems
(IFES) and the International Center for
Transitional Justice (ICTJ) had been working
from the region before the uprisings, many
others established their offices after January
2011, for example the International Institute for
Democracy and Electoral Assistance (Idea); the
ICTJ office in Cairo and the International Bar
Association’s Human Rights Institute (IBAHRI);
the latter of which is exploring the possibility to
establish an office in Cairo. These international
organisations became visible after the uprisings.
While such organisations tend to engage with
local actors in the transition processes, it seems
that they were optimistic regarding the political
and legal environment that would allow them to
operate without restrictions. However, the recent
attack against foreign funding in Egypt, and in
turn the work of the international organisation,
may cast a shadow on this optimism.
Unfortunately, the lack of communication and
coordination among donors may affect their
grant-making strategies. For example,
duplicating the same activities or funding the
same grantee for the same activity can occur. Yet,
there were very few joint activities by donors to
assess the new development. There have been
very few cases of donor coordination meetings.
4 Conclusion
It is important to note that there has not been a
change in the cultural and political context in
which Western donors are engaging with local
actors – hence to act as if there is an entirely free
political environment to work with is highly
illusionary. However, there were questions as to
whether their enthusiasm for supporting
democracy and rights would be matched by a
new approach to engagement.
Donors continue to release funding through the
usual civil society channels, despite a pronounced
policy of supporting youth. In fact the term
‘Youth’ which is being used excessively after the
uprisings is more ideological and political than
institutional. In other words, young people have
been active in the streets or as virtual actors and
in media discourse, but they are barely organised
institutionally. Youth coalitions for example are
many, some are part of the political groups and
others are not clearly identified. In this context,
donors have no channels through which to
communicate with many of them, except through
political channels or ordinary civil society groups.
In addition, the majority of youth are difficult to
approach because they are detached from
political and civil society domains. Accordingly,
effective engagement of youth will not be
achieved as a short-term plan, but should be seen
as a long-term strategy. Otherwise, donors will
play a role in creating a new ‘youth-elitism’.
Moreover, security interests continue to trump
genuine support for democratisation movements.
For example, combating terrorism, ‘illegal’
migration, and the Arab–Israeli conflict, which
had framed the relation between Arab and
Western countries, are still issues to be
considered. It is clear that there is no clear new
vision about the impact of such critical issues on
international cooperation. However, the foreign
policy interests continue to direct foreign donors’
policies in a way that runs counter to the
interests of advancing progressive social and
political change. This is no more evident than in
the sudden rush of many international policy
actors to engage with the Muslim Brotherhood at
the expense of other actors.
This indicates that the power interests that
shape the geo-strategic interests of donors in the
region, as well as the continued reliance on failed
approaches, coupled with a highly antagonistic
political environment towards Western aid has
undermined the prospects of funding policies
that better speak to the priorities of progressive
local actors. Some channels of Western funding,
which are less directly associated with geo-
strategic agendas, have sought to identify new
actors and increase support for promoting
democracy and social justice. However, they still
face the challenge of overcoming the cultural
and political barriers in creative ways.
It seems that while there has been a shift in
funding patterns, there is as yet no evidence of a
paradigm shift.




2 Global Trends in NGO Law 3.3, June 2011,
www.icnl.org/knowledge/globaltrends/
GloTrends3-1.htm
3 It is worth mentioning that Cairo hosted one
of these conferences: the International
Conference on Population and Development
in 1994. Ironically, Tunisia hosted the second
phase of the World Summit on the
Information Society (WSIS) in 2005.
4 The US aid for democracy and governance is a
small part of the economic assistance, which is
divided among several sectors. In the financial
year 2009/10, the fund for democracy and
governance was $23.5 million and $29 million,
respectively, although the military fund is
around $1.3 billion.
5 Office of the Inspector General, the US Agency
for International Development, Audit of
USAID/Egypt’s Democracy and Governance
Activities, Audit Report No. 6-263-10-001-P,
27 October 2009, www.usaid.gov/oig/public/
fy10rpts/6-263-10-001-p.pdf
6 In this regard, see Shadi Hamid, Civil Society in
the Arab World and the Dilemma of Funding,
www.brookings.edu/articles/2010/10_middle_
east_hamid.aspx
7 Money, Market Access, Mobility – Three Ms to
Underpin EU Support to its Southern Neighbours,
11 March 2011, www.enpi-info.eu/
mainmed.php?id_type=1&id=24485
8 European Peace Building Liaison Office,
‘Using More for More: Incentivizing Peace in
the EU’s Neighbourhood Policy’, public
statement, 25 July 2011.
9 European Commission, Joint Communication
to the European Council, the European
Parliament, the European Economic and
Social Committee and the Committee of the
Regions, Brussels, 8 March 2011,
http://eeas.europa.eu/euromed/docs/
com2011_200_en.pdf
10 S. Füle, European Commissioner for
Enlargement and Neighbourhood Policy, speech
on the recent events in North Africa Committee
on Foreign Affairs (AFET), European
Parliament Brussels, 28 February 2011,
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.
do?reference=SPEECH/11/130
11 S. McInerney, SCAF’s Assault on Egypt’s Civil
Society, 28 September 2011,
http://mideast.foreignpolicy.com/category/
topic/foreign_aid
12 UNDP, Strategy of Response to Transformative
Change Championed by Youth in the Arab Region.
13 ILO, Challenges in the Arab World: An ILO Response,
www.ilo.org/public/english/bureau/pardev/
development/mena.htm (accessed 8 July 2011).
14 Press Conference by United Nations High
Commissioner for Human Rights, Navi Pillay,
Geneva, 30 June 2011 – Statement,
www.ohchr.org/en/NewsEvents/Pages/Display
News.aspx?NewsID=11194&LangID=E
15 Arab Transition Fund is an initiative to work
through local or regional non-governmental
entities which re-grant the funds to other
local actors.
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